Changes in advisor compensation can show up in client portfolios quickly, and the effect appears strongest when new money enters an advisory relationship. A study using account data from a Spanish investment firm finds that clients’ fund investments shifted toward funds that became more financially attractive to their advisors after a compensation change tied to MiFID II’s 2018 implementation. The findings put compensation design inside the investment process: incentives can affect what clients hold, not just how advice is delivered.
The paper, by Battiston, Vidal and Vallve, and Lou, is published in the Journal of Finance in 2026. Its analysis focuses on trailer fees, recurring commissions mutual funds pay to advisors. Because the reform changed compensation for some advisor-fund relationships, the researchers could compare client investment behavior as those incentives changed. Their design also lets them compare affected relationships with clients whose advisors’ trailer fees did not change.
New contributions carry the clearest signal
The authors report that client portfolios began adjusting toward advisors’ new incentives soon after the reform, with changes unfolding over roughly 18 months. Placebo comparisons show no similar investment shifts for clients whose advisors experienced no trailer-fee change, and the researchers find broadly flat trends before the reform. Those checks support the interpretation that altered incentives contributed to the subsequent portfolio changes.
The adjustment did not mainly take the form of clients selling established fund positions and replacing them with newly favored products. Instead, clients brought more money into their fund portfolios, and a disproportionate share of that new capital went to funds that paid their advisors more under the revised incentives. Existing holdings did not show a systematic shift toward those funds.
That distinction helps explain why the estimated relationship between trailer fees and investment was much stronger for new clients. The paper puts the elasticity at about 150% for new clients, roughly three times the estimate for existing clients. The pattern points to a particularly sensitive stage: when an advisor is establishing a portfolio or a client adds capital, fund selection may respond more to compensation incentives.
Trust can increase an advisor’s influence
The study also finds larger incentive effects among clients with longer relationships and among some advisor-client pairs with greater social or geographic proximity. The authors treat these characteristics as possible proxies for trust, while cautioning that the interaction results do not establish that trust itself causes the stronger response.
That qualification matters. A long relationship can help an advisor understand a client’s goals and constraints, and it can make advice easier to follow. Yet the same confidence may also increase an advisor’s influence over investment decisions. If compensation favors one fund over another, a trusted recommendation could carry more weight. Relationship tenure alone, then, doesn’t demonstrate that incentives are aligned.
Financial knowledge is associated with smaller estimated losses
Clients who said they understood how investment funds work were less responsive to advisors’ compensation incentives. The finding suggests that financial knowledge can help people assess professional advice, as well as make decisions independently. A client familiar with fund fees, diversification and product differences may be better placed to weigh a recommendation against alternatives.
The paper estimates welfare losses associated with distorted advice before the 2018 reform at about 6% for existing clients and 9% for new clients under its baseline framework. For clients with higher financial knowledge, the corresponding estimates are much lower: around 1.3% for existing clients and 3.4% for new clients. These are model-based estimates, not realized investment returns, and their size depends on the paper’s framework.
The reform also reduced estimated welfare losses linked to conflicted advice. Depending on the assumptions and client group, the authors estimate reductions of roughly one-fifth to one-half. They further report that the more balanced incentives associated with the reform translated into higher portfolio efficiency through lower average fees and stronger diversification. The results don’t imply that advice has no value; they indicate that compensation can shape the portfolio outcomes produced through advice.
Implications for advisory firms
Compensation design deserves review as part of portfolio governance. Disclosure can inform clients about incentives, but the study’s results suggest firms should also examine whether product-level payments make some recommendations more rewarding for advisors than others. A useful operational question is whether the firm’s compensation arrangements support recommendations that fit client objectives across the available fund choices.
Onboarding and new contributions merit particular attention. The evidence points to new capital as the main route through which advisor incentives affected fund allocations. Portfolio construction for new clients, rollovers, liquidity events and large contributions are therefore moments when firms may want clear review procedures for recommendations and their rationale.
Financial education can also complement advice. Clients who understand investment funds may be better equipped to ask why a particular product fits their needs, what alternatives were considered and how compensation works. The paper’s estimates show a marked difference by reported financial knowledge, though they don’t establish that education alone will remove conflicts or guarantee better outcomes.
Reading the evidence in context
The study draws on detailed data from one Spanish investment firm and uses the 2018 MiFID II implementation as a natural experiment. Its findings offer evidence on how compensation changes can affect investment behavior in that setting. They don’t, by themselves, establish that the same response will occur at every firm or in every market.
The paper’s central practical signal is more specific: client investment patterns responded to changes in advisor incentives, and the response was concentrated in new money and new client relationships. For firms assessing advice quality, that makes the terms attached to fund recommendations and the handling of incoming assets meaningful parts of portfolio oversight.
A version of the paper is available here. More academic finance paper summaries are available in the Academic Research Insight category.
Chart from the paper
The accompanying table reports regressions on the likelihood of a relationship between prospective advisors and prospective clients, alongside measures of social distance. Each observation represents a client-advisor combination.

The results are hypothetical and are not an indicator of future results. They do not represent returns attained by any investor. Indexes are unmanaged, do not reflect management or trading fees, and cannot be invested in directly.
Abstract
We use granular data from an investment firm and a credible identification strategy to estimate the effect of financial advisors’ incentives on client investments. Exploiting a natural experiment triggered by the 2018 implementation of Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II), we find that clients’ investments respond strongly to changes in advisor incentives. Advisors react through multiple mechanisms: (i) inducing existing clients to bring in new money, (ii) channeling it to high‐incentive funds, and (iii) attracting more new clients. We also find that the MiFID II reform generated more balanced incentives, which translated into higher portfolio efficiency through lower average fees and stronger portfolio diversification.
The Effect of Advisors’ Incentives on Clients’ Investments was originally published at Alpha Architect. Please read the Alpha Architect disclosures.